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## JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS AS AFFECT- ING THE CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC

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For centuries the great question in the diplomatic world has been the balance of power in Europe. The wit of the greatest statesmen has been exerted to devise plans for retaining it; alliances have been formed upon the basis of it; wars have been fought to restore it; considerations of race and religion have been sacrificed upon its altar; colonial questions, and, to a large degree, commercial questions were considered with reference to their bearing upon it. In short, it was the pivot upon which the diplomacy of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries revolved. As a corollary to this, the Atlantic, and the control thereof, has been a factor of prime importance in the political and commercial life of the powers holding the center of the stage during those centuries.

But with the close of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century the horizon of world politics widens. New forces appear and new characters have come upon the stage. The phrase "balance of power in Europe" is no longer an adequate title for the drama of world diplomacy. While the law governing world politics has not changed, and everything still gravitates toward the center, the center has shifted. The Pacific and not the Atlantic is the center of the stage on which the drama of twentieth century politics will be played. However imperfectly Europe may realize this, it is nevertheless the fact.

Though the United States, during its early history, has, by reason of owing its origin to European settlement, had its attention centered on the Atlantic, it early began to realize that the Pacific ought not to be neglected. Scarcely

had the war of the Revolution been fought to a successful issue before American merchants fitted out vessels to sail the Pacific in the direct trade with the Far East. As early as 1784, the *Empress of China*, an American vessel, was plying between New York and Canton, China. By 1787, we had an American consul, Samuel Shaw, at Canton. In writing of our trade relations with China, he says, in a letter to Jay, January, 1787: "On the whole, it must be a satisfactory consideration to every American, that his country can carry on its commerce with China under advantages, if not in many respects superior, yet in all cases equal, to those possessed by other people." Within the next two years, the *Eleanor*, the *Fair American*, the *Grace* and the *Columbia* had entered into competition for the "infant and lucrative China trade." The trade between the American coasts and China soon grew in importance and up to 1814 was almost entirely carried by American vessels. It was during this quarter century that the Americans established commercial relations with the Marquesas, Charlotte and Sandwich Islands. They had also become active competitors in the whale fisheries of the Pacific.

By 1812, our interests in the Pacific were of sufficient importance to attract governmental attention, and in that year, President Madison commissioned Edward Fanning as commander of an expedition of discovery and placed at his disposal the ships *Volunteer* and *Hope*. The war prevented the sailing of the expedition. In the same year Captain Porter in command of the *Essex*, the first American warship to sail the Pacific, received orders to cruise in the South Seas, where he captured two and a half million dollars worth of British property and 360 British seamen, took possession of and fortified Madison Island.

During this period of activity of American interests on the Pacific, the United States purchased Louisiana, and the expedition of Lewis and Clarke, backed by the expansionist spirit of the American pioneers, had extended our possessions to the Pacific coast. This acquisition of territory was a guarantee that henceforward the United States would be one of the powers to whom the control of the Pacific would

be a matter of vital concern—a concern which was intensified by the acquisition of California and Alaska. How far this anxiety to secure territory on the shores of the Pacific was due to a conscious appreciation of its importance and how far to a natural instinct to expand, matters not for our present purposes.

The discovery of gold in California served to advertise the importance of our Pacific coast and paved the way for an effort to open trade relations with Japan. To quote the language of President Fillmore in his letter conveyed to the Emperor of Japan by Commodore Perry, "The United States of America reach from ocean to ocean and our territory of Oregon and the state of California lie directly opposite the domain of Your Imperial Majesty. Our steamships can go from California to Japan in 18 days. Our great state of California produces about sixty million dollars in gold every year. . . . Japan is also a rich and fertile country and produces many valuable articles. Your Imperial Majesty's subjects are skilled in many of the arts. I am desirous that our two countries should trade with each other for the benefit of both Japan and the United States."

Upon this basis of mutual benefits the trade and diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were established and upon this basis of reciprocal benefits they have always rested. It is entirely within the facts to say that from the very beginning our relations have squared with the highest standards of ethics. No one who has studied the text or the workings of the Townsend Harris treaties will say that there is any trace of an attempt to overreach or drive a hard bargain at the expense of a less fortunate neighbor. The commerce which they provided for between the two countries was not disadvantageous to Japan from an economic standpoint, nor were the trade relations thus established ever used by the United States as a means for securing political control of any portion of the Japanese Empire. Instead of attempting to make any part of it a sphere of American interests, we have sought to make the whole empire a sphere of American ideas. That we have

succeeded measurably in this is attested by the fact that everywhere the Japanese are known as the Yankees of the Far East.

But are the friendly relations which have existed thus far between the two great powers on the Pacific merely temporary, or may we reasonably expect them to be permanent? In other words, is there a sufficient basis for an enduring friendship between them? Or, is there such a clash of interests as to overcome the traditional friendship?

True, there is not between the United States and Japan, as between the United States and England, a community of blood, language, and religion. There are not these ties to unite the two nations. Yet these are not the only bonds by which nations may be held together. While they are by no means unimportant, it is entirely within the facts to say that they are becoming less important. It is but little over a century since the political policies of a State were controlled very largely by its religious beliefs. If the monarch were Catholic, he chose his allies from among Catholic countries, and, if Protestant, from among Protestant countries. Today England has among its allies: Catholics, Buddhists and Mohammedans. The fact that the Sultan is the head of the Mohammedan religion has not prevented England from championing his cause against Russia. While the United States has from the standpoint of religion little in common with Russia, China or Japan, it has always pursued a policy of friendship toward them, however hostile certain of its individual citizens may have been toward the religions of those countries. The waning power of the church over the state is shown in the triumph of separation in France and the majority in the House of Commons in favor of disestablishment in England. Except in a few fanatical countries, foreign policies are not now determined by religious beliefs and there is nothing to indicate a likelihood of a change in this respect.

The prejudices due to blood are far less strong than they once were and are constantly weakening. The old feeling which divided all into Greeks and barbarians has not entirely disappeared and probably never will, but like all other prej-

udices and provincialisms it does not flourish in the atmosphere of modern scientific thought. Such prejudices rest mainly upon ignorance. Hence, it is fair to suppose that, in the future as in the past, improvements in the means of transportation and of communicating intelligence will, by enabling the peoples of different parts of the world and of different races to understand each other better, cause a decrease in racial prejudices.

A difference in language is not so great a barrier as it once was. The rapid increase in international trade is forcing each nation to learn more of the language as well as of the customs and industries of the other. The more important writings in each language are either translated into the others or furnish the inspiration for treatises in the others embodying substantially the same ideas. Thus the thoughts which determine national and international action are to a greater and greater extent becoming the common property of all nations, in spite of the differences in language.

While the lack of these bonds has been growing less important, the bond due to a community of interests has been growing stronger. Though commercial advantage is not the sole factor in determining national policies, it is nevertheless an important factor. That friendship between the United States and Japan is a decided commercial advantage to both can readily be concluded from a reference to the facts. One of the great facts of recent decades is the unprecedented growth in international trade. And nowhere has this increase been more marked than in the trade between the United States and Japan. According to the Statistical Abstract, the value of the exports from the United States to Japan in 1865 was \$41,913. From this insignificant sum the trade has grown until but forty years later the exports are valued at \$51,719,183. During the same period the value of imports has increased from \$285,176 to \$51,821,629. After allowing for the effect of war, this growth is certainly marvelous. Between 1895 and 1905 the exports from the United States to Japan increased in value from \$4,634,717 to \$51,719,683 and the imports from \$23,790,202 to \$51,821,629. Thus during a single decade our exports to Japan

increased over 1000 per cent and our imports over 100 per cent. Our imports now amount to \$70,392,722.

That this growth has not been due to accident, or a series of accidents, will become evident by an inquiry into the causes which underly it. The geographical location of the countries is such as to make trade between them easy. In this respect the United States has a decided advantage over the countries of Europe. The route across the Pacific is shorter, safer and hence cheaper than the Suez or Cape of Good Hope routes. The control of the Pacific route is in the hands of the United States, by reason of its possession of the coaling stations and ports of call. When this trade is developed to the proportions which it must from the nature of the case attain, the significance of our possession of the string of islands between our coast and that of Asia will be appreciated by many who seem as yet to have no conception of it. The course of history has been determined largely by the possession of trade routes.

The difference in the commodities produced in the two countries is such as to make the United States and Japan trade allies, i.e., to make them seek to promote rather than to place obstacles in the way of trade with each other. To appreciate the truth of this we have but to glance at the staple products of the two countries. Japan produces raw silk cheaply and though the United States has attempted it, the attempts have availed us nothing, except to show that either our soil or climate, or both, are not adapted to the industry. We are therefore importing about 90 per cent of the raw silk exported from Japan and making it into fabrics, instead of doing as we once did—purchasing those fabrics from Europe, and paying for them with the products of our farms. We still pay for them with the products of our farms, but it is now simply the raw material that we pay for, and give to our own factories the opportunity of performing the processes which enhance its value, instead of paying for having the same done in European factories.

Tea is another staple of Japanese production which has never been raised profitably in the United States. So far as can be seen, American tea will remain a negligible



quantity in the commerce of the world. It is therefore not at all surprising that the United States should take three-fourths of the tea exported by Japan.

There are certain classes of works of art which the United States imports from Japan. These also are not and for a long time will not be produced in the United States. The artistic temperament and abilities of a people are something which does not change rapidly. The whims of fashion may be ephemeral, but the ability to produce and the desire for artistic creations are far more constant.

As Japan is the available source from which the United States secures and will continue to secure the above classes of goods, there are certain other classes for the supply of which Japan looks and under normal conditions will look to the United States. Perhaps the most important of these is raw cotton. Cut off the supply of this staple and immediately one of the great industries of Japan is at a standstill. And such is the industrial organization of today that one industry cannot suffer without causing a considerable demoralization in all other industries. During the period of hand industries the makers of iron would be affected but slightly by a shut down among the makers of cloth. Each operative depended very largely upon his own capital. But under the factory system of today, let one industry be brought suddenly to a standstill and several of the banks that are furnishing money to manufacturers in that industry and others are forced to contract their loans and the stringency is felt all along the line. This is the mildest form which it can take. Not infrequently the shock causes several banks to break and confidence is so shaken that a financial panic results, and from the depressing, if not demoralizing, effects of financial panics no industry is exempt.

This dependence upon the United States of one of the great industries of Japan is a stronger guarantee of peace between the two nations than most of us appreciate. Japan is far too conservative a nation to lightly enter upon a war with the United States, knowing as she does that the consequences of such a war would be a suspension, if not destruction, of one of her industries thereby threatening her whole



industrial and financial organization. The danger of such losses and privations is too great a risk to run, except in self-defense. The mere prospect of enhanced military glory is not likely to appeal to Japan as being a commodity worth purchasing at such a price.

While the dependence of Japan upon the United States is less marked in other respects, there are nevertheless a number of commodities for which she is to a great degree dependent upon us. Most of the flour used in Japan is imported from the United States. Though there are other countries that produce flour, there are none of them that can compete successfully with the United States in the Japanese market. To be suddenly cut off from the American supply would therefore put the Japanese at a disadvantage with respect to this one of the necessities of life.

What is true of flour is equally true of kerosene. Nearly all of the kerosene used in Japan comes from the United States. As yet the product of the Russian oil fields does not seem to have found its way into the Japanese market. This may be due to the fact that the freight rates over the Trans-Siberian railway are not sufficiently low to enable the Russian shipper to compete with his American rival.

In locomotives, railway rails, and railway equipment in general, the United States is easily first in the list of competitors for Japanese contracts. This is due in part to our greater promptness in filling orders because of our resort to standard types and making hundreds according to the same pattern instead of waiting until an order is received and then drafting the plan according to which the locomotives, etc., in that order will be made, as is the custom in most European shops. Now that Japan has resolved to build the railroads which are indispensable to the development of Corea and southern Manchuria, her dependence upon the United States has in this respect increased very materially. Scarcely less pronounced is her dependence upon us for meat, structural iron, and machinery.

Among the marked tendencies of the last century has been the increasing influence of commercial considerations in determining the foreign policies of nations. Nor is there

any convincing evidence that this tendency has reached its height. When we consider this in connection with the commercial relations of the two countries, we have an excellent basis for the conclusion that, in the future as in the past, the United States and Japan will continue to coöperate with each other instead of foolishly casting aside the mutual advantages to be gained from a policy of friendly coöperation dictated by their geographical location and natural resources.

There is another force which cannot be left out of account, and that is the force of traditions. The United States is the first of the great nations of modern times with which Japan entered into diplomatic relations. From the opening of Japan by Commodore Perry, to the present day, the diplomatic relations of Japan with the United States have been of the most friendly character. Japan has never distrusted the motives of the United States, but on the contrary has always looked to it for friendly advice and guidance. She has paid us the compliment of sending hundreds of her brightest youths to be educated in our institutions, of sending commissions to study our industrial organization, of celebrating the anniversary of the landing of Commodore Perry and erecting a monument to his memory, and of bringing to a close at our suggestion a war in which she was uniformly victorious. Nor has Japan forgotten that in her struggle for fair commercial treatment at the hands of western nations and for ridding herself of the hateful handicap of consular jurisdiction, she received most valuable assistance from the United States. The confidence begotten of these years of close friendship and helpfulness is not to be shaken by the first gust of breezy criticism or by restrictions which are economically advantageous to Japan. Traditions, however friendly, may not be sufficient to outweigh national interests, but when reinforced by them they constitute a force which is difficult to overcome. They at least make it easy to explain away minor differences, and that is all that is necessary in order that the friendly relations between the United States and Japan may continue to bless both nations by enabling them to realize their own possi-

bilities and to exercise a wholesome influence for international peace.

But Japan and the United States are not the only first class powers having territory bordering on the Pacific and to whom the control of this highway of commerce is a matter of importance. In this list we find England, France, Germany and Russia. It is therefore fitting that we inquire to what extent the dominant position now held by the United States and Japan may in the future be challenged by any of those powers. And in this inquiry we will not assume the rôle of prophet and attempt to say what distant ages may bring forth, but will rather confine ourselves to the more practical task of diagnosing the situation with reference to the present and reasonably near future.

A decade ago, the position of Russia as an aspirant for power on the Pacific occasioned no small amount of anxiety. The situation was not only acute but threatening. Yet such is not now the case. The battle of Tsushima has made it clear that for a generation at least Russia will not be a formidable power on the Pacific. By this it is not meant that Russia will be a negligible factor in deciding political and commercial questions pertaining to the Pacific, but merely that she will not within a generation be in a position to dictate the rules of the road or to insist that any considerable portion of the Pacific be recognized as a sphere of Russian interest. To put it in more classic phrase, she will not be in a position to insist that all the Pacific shall be divided into three parts of which Russia shall have one.

The German emperor, whose habit it is in great crises to voice the aspirations and dictate the policy of his empire, has already waived the rights of Germany as a contender for supremacy in the Pacific by appropriating for himself the title of "Admiral of the Atlantic." But apart from this act which furnishes convincing evidence of a spirit of self-abnegation so characteristic of the man, Germany is at present too intimately bound up in the meshes of European politics to make it wise for her to launch any campaign for the annexation of the Pacific.

France is even less prepared than Germany to jeopardize

her European position for a possible increase of her influence in the Orient. For a generation, at least, her energies will be needed in developing and consolidating her North African empire. The successful completion of the task she has undertaken in Africa, which must needs take time, is too vital to her position and prestige in Europe to permit of her seeking other worlds to conquer. There is therefore no reason to apprehend that, within the near future, France will be a disturbing factor or will interfere seriously with the present equilibrium of forces in the Pacific.

England is a far less influential power on the Pacific than she was twenty years ago. At that time her commercial influence and naval power as well as her prestige in diplomacy were everywhere recognized and gave her the position of premier among the powers on the Pacific. But in the late eighties and early nineties she began to ask herself whether or not this influence was worth as much as it was costing and was likely to cost her. In other words she began to doubt whether or not "the game was worth the candle." By the time this period of doubt ended, her primacy was gone. Power rarely survives a period of such masterful inactivity. The situation, viewed in the light of the history of the past twenty years, warrants the conclusion that England has voluntarily withdrawn herself from the list of powers contending for the mastery of the Pacific. Nor is she likely to re-enter the lists, the abandonment of her naval base at Esquimalt indicates that she does not intend to question the supremacy of the United States and Japan.

I have refrained from mentioning China in this list, because although she is a power on the Pacific, she is not a first class power, nor is it certain that she ever will be. China has not yet passed through that stage in political evolution through which every state must pass in order to have its status as a first class power assured. The fundamental difficulty in China is that the people of one part do not appreciate sufficiently the fact that they have anything in common with the people in another part. Without this sense of unity, patriotism is impossible, the power to act in concert is impossible—and without the power to act in

concert, national achievement is handicapped to such an extent that it must suffer by comparison with that of nations not so handicapped. If the present revolution brings China to a consciousness of itself, wakes the Chinese people and gets them to see that they have a community of interests, China will become a great factor in world politics and her location will make her one of the leading powers on the Pacific. But it is not at all probable that China will in the near future be able to challenge the position of primacy now held by Japan and the United States.

But can the United States and Japan continue this joint tenancy? Can each of these treatyless allies brook equality or must there be a clash for the purpose of determining which shall yield supremacy to the other? In our judgment, such a clash is neither wise nor necessary, nor is it desired by either. There is honor enough and room enough for both. There is likewise work enough to enable the energies of both to find expression in constructive rather than in destructive operations. The character of work to be done is by no means such as to render coöperation disadvantageous. Each needs the products of the other's industry and neither can afford to spend its substance in crippling the other. Viewed from a selfish standpoint, each should rejoice at the legitimate success of the other, for in proportion as each becomes prosperous, in that proportion is its friendship valuable to the other. Japan has need of all her material energies in developing her industries, both at home and in her possessions, in strengthening the finances of her empire, in raising the standard of living of the artisan and laborer so as to bring the comforts of life to the home of the toiler. The United States likewise can find ample outlet for her surplus energies in developing her outlying possessions, cultivating the new fields of trade which the Panama Canal will be sure to open, and in solving the problems of government raised by the reorganization of her industries, by the change from rural to urban life and by the influx of the immigrant.

The only apples of discord suggested, even by those bent upon having a war, are the possession of the Philippines and

the immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States. The latter of these has been settled by treaty in a manner satisfactory to both parties and the conditions brought about by this treaty are such that the question is not likely to be reopened. *Requiescat in pacem.*

As for the possession of the Philippines, there is nothing in it hostile to the interests or aspirations of Japan. Japan has never aspired to the acquisition of territory in the tropics. What she needs is territory which will furnish an overflow ground for her surplus population and territory in the torrid zone will not do this. Furthermore, there is but one condition under which seizure of the Philippines by Japan would be of any use to her, and that is the possession by Japan of a navy superior to that of the United States. And of this the Japanese finances will not permit. Whatever else one may think of the Japanese, no one who has studied their character at all considers them a visionary people. And none but a visionary people would sacrifice their most vital interests to chase after a will-o'-the-wisp which could place but "a barren sceptre in their grasp."

In the language of the *Jiji*, which is the London *Times* of Japan: "As for our country, she has maintained toward America the traditional friendship that is peculiar and apart. Our relations have been exceedingly deep rooted."

Alike reassuring are the words of Count Hayashi, the leading diplomat of Japan: "In this world there are those who try to raise waves on a flat of ground by noising abroad a thing which, as Japanese we cannot even see in our dreams, such as a Japanese-American war." As evidence that this is a sincere expression of the Japanese mind we would cite that, in her treaty of alliance with Great Britain, Japan has agreed to a provision excepting the United States from the list of nations against whom Japan may invoke the aid of her ally in case of war. And although this exception was made in contemplation of the ratification of the general treaty of arbitration between the United States and Great Britain, it is admitted by the leading statesmen of Japan that the exception will hold even though ratification fail.

If, then, the United States possesses nothing which bars

the way to the realization by Japan of her national ideals and Japan possesses nothing half so valuable to the United States as her good-will, and apparently nothing of which we could deprive her except at the price of our self-respect, it is manifest that their interests lie in the direction of peace rather than war. Nor is there any excuse for allowing other nations to artfully stir up discord between them, for which work there is no disposition save by one or two. And in these cases it requires no political seer to discover the motive. Hence to suppose that such transparent deception would succeed requires either a sublime ignorance of human nature or a sublime distrust of the sanity of nations.

If the pending treaties between the United States on the one hand and England and France on the other are ratified, a similar treaty of general arbitration between the United States and Japan would have an excellent moral effect and all true lovers of peace could well rejoice at its ratification. But whether such a treaty is ratified or not, the surest guarantee of peace between Japan and the United States is that neither nation wants war. Given this condition of mind and there are no differences which cannot be harmonized without an appeal to the sword. It is a guarantee of peace regardless of parchments. The utility of the Japanese and American fleets on the Pacific consists therefore not in watching with envious eye the growth of each other or the progress of the nation to which it belongs, but rather in preventing any intruders from disturbing the balance of power in the Pacific.